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Due to the risk inherent in dependence on foreign oil, there is a social benefit in aiding the introduction of alternative energy sources into the market place. The Federal government has initiated a number of programs, including price subsidies, to help accelerate the market diffusion of new, alternative energy systems.
We develop a model to investigate analytically the effects of a price subsidy over time on the rate of market diffusion. The model considers word-of-mouth effects and learning curve cost declines. Under a set of conditions that a new technology should be expected to meet before commercialization, the optimal subsidy level is shown to be nonincreasing in time. The related market price is shown to be closely related to the diffusion effect. If there is no such effect, the price to the customer is constant. If there is positive diffusion effect, price increases in time, while if market saturation causes demand to decline over time price decreases in time.
(Price Subsidy; Diffusion of Innovations) Kotler (1982, p. 490) defines social marketing as "the design, implementation and control of programs seeking to increase the acceptability of a social idea or a cause." Although frequently referred to as "idea marketing," the concept can be readily applied to any attempt to effect desirable, social behavior.
This paper views the development of a Federal price subsidy policy for a new technology as an application of social marketing concepts. The purpose of the paper is to determine what general structure such a policy should take to be most cost-effective.
We proceed as follows: the next section introduces the problem the government faces in supporting and trying to promote new technologies, alternative energy sources in particular. Following that, we provide a brief review of models that characterize new technology penetration-diffusion models. The specific social marketing problem--developing a price subsidy policy to meet stated government objectives-is then introduced and explored. General results on the time-path of an optimal government subsidy policy are then determined and some special cases are studied.
Background: The Government as an Energy Systems Marketer
American dependence on foreign oil has been much discussed since the Arab oil embargo in 1973. Shortly after the embargo, President Nixon proposed Project Independence, a program designed to attain independence of foreign oil by 1980. An underestimate of the scope of the problem and an uncooperative Congress doomed the plan from the beginning. President Carter also faced an unresponsive Congress, and only after Iranian oil exports stopped late in 1978 did Congress pass emergency energy legislation, aimed at energy independence.
A major thrust of a number of Department of Energy programs is to reduce American dependence upon foreign oil by promoting energy conservation and funding the development of new alternative energy technologies, e.g., those producing energy from wind, water or the sun. The intention of the government appears to be to shorten the time until these new technologies produce competitively priced energy and also to produce security of supply in the interim.
Since there is national risk associated with dependence on unreliable foreign oil suppliers, the real cost of oil is higher than its world market price. Schmalensee (1980) argues that it would be socially beneficial to tax this oil. Since such a tax does not exist, the current world oil price is below what could be referred to as a socially efficient level, the price adjusted by a risk premium. Therefore, government support for commercialization of alternative energy sources can be defended as necessary for a fair (efficient) market place. Indeed, even if energy prices were at socially efficient levels, Schmalensee (1980) cites four kinds of situations where direct government support of commercialization of alternative energy sources might produce net societal benefits: (a) when ignorance/prejudice of potential buyers poses a large industry obstacle, (b) when institutional obstacles are large, (c) when initial commercialization-scale operations are required to resolve uncertainties and the benefits would spill over to other firms, and (d) when uncertainty about future legislative actions has a strong influence on the riskiness of the investment.
The government has available to it many classes of support options that have different effects on market penetration. These include the following.
Fundamental R & D is designed to lower long-run energy production costs and indirectly reduce the price to the consumer.
Production process development is designed to lower intermediate term energy production costs.
Guaranteed buys occur when the government forms a market, lowering uncertainty about future demand to encourage the building of efficient production facilities. This lowers production cost and, indirectly, consumer price. Demonstration programs remove perceptual barriers, showing that systems work, and cause a word-of-mouth (diffusion) effect.
Granls and subsidies (to the consumer) lower the price and, by stimulating demand, lower production cost through experience curve learning effects.
Training and infrastructure developments are aimed at reducing the barriers to penetration among members of the community builders, installers, lenders, and service personnel, These individuals also rnay have a word-of-mouth (diffusion) ef fect.
Advertising removes barriers b y raising awareness and lowering uncertainty, thereby creating a potential diffusion effect as well.
As an example, for photovoltaics (solar batteries), the government established a program aimed at accelerating private market penetration. Acceleration is to be realized through the following:
Reduce photovoltaic (PV) system costs; Gain consumer acceptance of PV by building working demonstration sites ;
Create early awareness among potential customers by information dissemination (Jet Propulsion Laboratories, 1980) . The Department of Energy (DOE) created the National Photovoltaic Research, Development and Demonstration Program to attain these goals. The program has proposed funding of $1.5 billion to be allocated over the ten-year period 1979-1988, covering most of the activities outlined above. Section 2(b) of the Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research Development and Demonstration Act of 1978 enumerates four specific goals for photovoltaic development and adoption :
To establish " . . . an aggressive research, development and demonstration program . . . " for PV systems to produce electricity " . . . cost competitive with utility generated electricity . . . "
To double the annual production of PV systems every year beginning in 1979 and culminating with 2000 peak megawatts annually in 1988.
To reduce the average cost of installed PV systems to $l/peak watt by 1988. To ensure that at least 90% of all PV systems produced in 1988 are purchased by private buyers.
The Department of Energy has established comparable goals for several other alternative energy technologies.
Here we see government program goals stated as penetration targets ("annual production of 2000 peak megawatts in 1988"). This contrasts with the (theoretically) more desirable approach of maximizing some social welfare function. Many mission-oriented public policy makers are comfortable with penetration targets because they provide a "clear statement of how well we've done and what we must still accomplish" (Department of Energy, private communication, 1982) . The social welfare function approach is more nebulous, more difficult to specify and apply.
In what follows, we operationalize this penetration-target approach, assuming that the government is concerned about how to allocate its resources to maximize market penetration of the alternative energy source by the end of a planning horizon. This approach is consistent with a social welfare point of view as follows. Since imported oil has risk of supply discontinuity, there is a net social benefit in displacing imported oil. Each photovoltaic system installed displaces (saves) some average number of barrels of oil during its lifetime. Under the Hotelling (1931) rule that oil costs escalate at approximately the rate of interest, a budget allocation that maximizes the total penetration of photovoltaics will, at the same time, maximize the net present (societal) benefit of fuel saved. The assumption that cost escalates at the rate of interest means that the net present value of the societal benefit is independent of the timing of the savings and is then one-to-one with maximizing the penetration of photovoltaics. Similar arguments apply for other alternative energy systems. The problem we consider, then, is: how should one design a subsidy that will maximize the number of systems installed during the planning horizon, given a budget for the total subsidy? We assume that the market is governed by experience curve cost declines and diffusion effects peculiar to new product introduction. While the more general problem is to determine the total subsidy budget as well as to maximize the net surplus (the benefit minus the cost), we focus here only on the subproblem of the subsidy rate path over time given a budget. Our objective is to study the qualitative nature of that time path under general conditions rather than to determine specific, quantitative recommendations.
New Product Diffusion
Diffusion models relate the rate of new product adoption over time to product characteristics (price, features, etc.), population characteristics (size, income) and penetration level (number of previous adopters-the word-ofmouth effect). The model introduced by Bass (1969) have not yet adopted (N -x ) times the conditional probability of adoption (a + bx):
( 1 ) (Here we adopt the convention that x denotes the time derivative dx/dt.) Most diffusion models introduced since the 1969 Bass article are extensions or variations of this model. Several models have incorporated the impact of price and experience curve cost declines (Robinson and Lakhani 1975; Bass 1980; Dolan and Jeuland 1981; Jeuland and Dolan 1982; Jeuland 1981b; Bass and Bultez 1982; Kalish 1983 . Also see Mahajan and Muller 1979 , for a review).
We formulate the model here generally as x = f(x, p), where p is the price to the consumer. The functional form for f is not specified here, which will permit us to develop results that are more general.
Model Assumptions and Formulation
Models are simplified representations of real situations. Our assumptions balance the simplicity needed to develop results against the complexities of the real world. We specify below our assumptions about the dynamics of demand, production cost, firm pricing strategies and the objective function.
Assumptions
Demand Dy price and the mouth as well namics. We assume that product sales depend on product cumulative number of adopters. This incorporates word-ofas market size (saturation) effects. While the demand for these systems also depends on the price of substitutes (e.g., world oil prices), these substitute prices can be assumed to increase at the rate of interest. Therefore, demand can be assumed to depend only on the system price, where price is measured in current dollars. We also assume that the price consumers see will only change gradually over time, so that the effect of consumer anticipation of major, abrupt price changes (resulting perhaps from changes in government subsidy policy) can be ignored.
Production Dynamics and Economics. Production cost is affected by many factors such as experience, production rate, etc. (see Alchian 1959) . A popular way of capturing this effect is the experience curve (see, e.g., Boston Consulting Group 1970), although the approach is not without its critics (Abernathy and Wayne 1974) . We will assume that unit production cost is a decreasing function of cumulative production.
Firm Behavior. We assume a competitive environment, so that prices directly relate to costs. In particular we assume that price is a constant markup over average unit cost for the marginal producer. While this assumption is a good one in markets with many competitors (there are currently several dozen producers of solar panels), it may hold also in certain monopolis tic or oligopolis tic markets. For example, if demand elasticity is cons tan t, then the short-term profit maximization price is q / ( l l -1) -mc where is demand elasticity, and mc is marginal production cost. Here price is again a constant markup over cost.
Government Objectives and Controls. The objective here is to maximize the number of installations by the end of the planning period, subject to a budget constraint, where market behavior is governed by the dynamics of innovation diffusion. The control here is the price subsidy given to the customer, as a percentage of buying price (either as a tax credit or direct grant).
Formulation
We introduce the following notation: p(t) = price charged by the firm, c(t) = marginal cost of production of the firm, x(t) = cumulative sales (or number of adopters for a durable good), s(t) = x(t) = sales rate, y (t) = the portion of price paid by buyer. (So 1 -y (t) = fraction subsidized by the government.) y ( r ) = cumulative government spending by t. Our formulation is governed by the following equations:
Let T be the end of the planning horizon, and B the budget. Since the markup is assumed constant, we incorporate it into the cost function, and write p = c(x). The government's problem then is to find y (t) to max x(T), subject to y = 1 -y ) ,
The problem then is to find the subsidy rate over time, that maximizes the number of units sold by time T, given a budget B.' While normally we expect the subsidy rate to be between zero and one, there is no reason to constrain y, since outside these limits it would be either a tax or a giveaway. A correct specification of the demand function will ensure that the optimal solution makes sense. We assume a normal price effect, i.e., 3 f(x, p)/ap < 0, and that cost declines with experience, dp(x)/dx < 0.
There are several questions of interest here.
(1) What is the optimal percentage subsidy over time (1 -y(t))? (2) How does the price the consumer sees, yp, change over time? (3) How does demand change over time? (4) What is the path for the government spending rate over time? We will show that the answers to these questions depend on certain product and market characteristics. First we will characterize the optimal solution in general, and then we shall investigate several specific demand functions.
To proceed with the analysis of the optimal subsidy timepath, we apply the 'Note that the problem as formulated above is equivalent to a pricing problem faced by a monopolist whose objective is to maximize penetration by a target date, subject to a profit (loss) constraint. We will comment on this later. maximum principle (Pontryagin et al. 1962) . We introduce the adjoint variables, h and +, and form the Hamiltonian:
where h and + are defined by the differential equation:
The adjoint variables are the shadow prices of the constraints at each point in time. Here h(t) is the marginal contribution of x ( t ) to the objective function, and therefore it is always positive. + is the marginal contribution of ~( r ) , which is constant, since the marginal contribution of all dollars spent should be equal. It is also negative, since if more is spent by t , then there is less money left in the budget, and fewer systems will be sold.
The maximum principle states that the optimal solution, y *, must maximize the Hamiltonian at each point in time, where x, y, h and + are determined by equations (2) and (4). Therefore assuming an interior solution, a necessary condition is that the derivative of H vanishes, aH/ay = 0. Taking that derivative and rearranging we get: where the usual price elasticity, evaluated at yp. Setting H,, = 0, and rearranging, we get:
Note that unless the elasticity, q, is constant, (6) is an implicit equation for y *,
In what follows we will characterize the optimal solution for several situations. We will state the results verbally here, while the technical details are presented in the appendix. (Unless otherwise stated, price from now on means consumers' price, yp.) Case A. Repeat Purchase Gooh For repeat purchase goods, diffusion and saturation effects play a minor role. Therefore demand is mainly a function of price. Production costs, however, may experience cost declines, particularly for new technologies (e.g., gasohol, oil-shale, etc.). So in this case we assume x = f(yp), and p = ~( x ) .
Assuming an internal solution, that solution is characterized as follows :
The optimal subsidy rate, 1 -y(t), decreases monotonically over time:
Consumer price, yp is constant over time. Consequently demand, x, is constant over time.
Government spending decreases monotonically over time.
If, as here, demand is not affected by penetration level, then the optimal subsidy policy keeps price constant over time. Since in our case cost declines with experience, then the subsidy rate, and spending level, decline monotonically over time (see Figure 1) . (See Appendix, Parts I and I1 for proofs.)
Case B. Separable Demand Consider the class of demand functions that can be written as a product of the price effect and the penetration effect,
. This type of model has been widely used in marketing (Robinson and Lakhani 1975; Dolan and Jeuland 1981; Jeuland and Dolan 1982) , although it has limitations (Jeuland 1981b; Kalish 1983) . The optimal solution in this case is characterized as follows:
The optimal subsidy rate is monotonically decreasing as long as the penetration effect is positive, i.e., 3 f(x, yp)/3x > 0 implies
Price to the consumer, yp, increases if the penetration effect is positive, and vice versa.
Government spending decreases as long as subsidy rates decrease if and either q is constant, or dq/dp > 0. For well-designed products we expect positive word-of-mouth at introduction, which overcomes the saturation effect (negligible at this time). Therefore for products for which the separable demand form is appropriate, the optimal subsidy rate is monotonically decreasing, with a resulting increase in price over time. This encourages new buyers to try early who, in turn, have positive effects on future demand. Whenever this word-of-mouth effect disappears, price becomes constant. Negative saturation effects later on will cause a decreasing price. However, this part of the life cycle is not as applicable here. Consider the demand function used by Robinson and Lakhani (1975) , and others, Here the diffusion part is a Bass (1969) model, where b represents the word-of-mouth coefficient. If bN > a , then a f / a x > 0 as long as Therefore price increases up to this point, and decreases afterward. However if bN < a, the subsidized price is monotonically decreasing (see Figure 2) . Note that the pricing policy result is similar to that of Dolan and Jeuland (1981) , and Kalish (1983) . (See Appendix, Parts I and 111 for proofs.)
Case C . A Class of Durable Goods Models
As noted earlier, separable models may not be appropriate for certain products, durables in particular. A class of other models that is appropriate is as follows (Kalish 1983) . Let N ( p ) be the potential market penetration at a given price. Then at any time, t, the remaining potential is the potential minus the number installed units, N ( p ) -x , for which the probability of purchase can be a function of penetration, h(x), leading to:
For this model, the previous results are not definitive. Here there is a tradeoff between subsidizing early adopters, i.e., those who are willing to pay the most for the system, and saving resources for the later adopters. We summarize these results for this case as follows:
The optimal subsidy rate can be either decreasing or increasing in this case and specific functional forms must be investigated. If, however, there is no cost decline with experience, and the diffusion effect is small, then the subsidy rate increases in time.
If the diffusion effect is small, then the optimal price to the consumer decreases in time.
In this case, unless the word-of-mouth effect is strong, price must decrease over time, and thus the subsidy rate must increase if the cost decline is small. This follows because early adopters are those who are willing to pay more, and so it is more cost-effective to subsidize later adopters. If the word-ofmouth effect is strong, however, then it is still possible to have a high subsidy at introduction in such a way that price initially increases and decreases later on. (See Appendix, Parts I and IV for proofs.) 
Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the price subsidy problem the government faces in supporting new technologies, new energy sources in particular. We have argued why government support could be justified in this case, and have looked at how word-of-mouth, market saturation, and learning curve cost declines affect the subsidy policy. While there are no definitive solutions that apply for all cases, a few guidelines do emerge:
a. For repeat purchase goods, where demand does not depend on penetra-tion, the optimal subsidy policy has price constant over the whole planning period. This means that the subsidy rate decreases, since production costs decrease. Similarly, government spending decreases over time. b. If new repeat purchase goods do experience demand expansion as a result of word-of-mouth (separable demand), then it is optimal to subsidize early adopters by having a low introductory price that increases the steady state level as demand stabilizes. Again, the subsidy rate and spending are high at the beginning and decreasing.
c. For a more general class of durable goods, if the word-of-mouth effect is strong at introduction, then a subsidy so that price is initially low and increasing is possible. Following this early period, however, price should decrease over time. This means that the subsidy rate could actually be increasing, if the cost decline is not large enough. However, for 'good' products, those that exhibit cost declines and positive word-of-mouth, the optimal subsidy rate is likely to decline.
From the above it seems that in many situations subsidy rates should be higher early and decrease later on. It is interesting to compare this with the Federal Government's policy: in 1979, the Federal renewable energy resource property tax credit was 30% of the first $2,000, and 20% of the next $7,000. In 1980 the tax credit was increased to 40% of the first $10,000. We can interpret this inconsistency in two ways:
(1) either the model assumptions are too restrictive to explain actual policies (the more likely option), or (2) the original subsidy rate was mistakenly too low, and it was corrected by increasing it. It remains to be seen if the subsidy rate will decrease in the future.
While we have not incorporated the size of the budget as a decision variable, it is our conjecture that unless the product becomes "economically competitive" at some point in the future, it should not be subsidized. This means that only products that are likely to exhibit cost declines, and positive word-of-mouth, would be subsidized, resulting in optimal subsidies as outlined above.
The results presented here are highly dependent on the problem specification and assumptions. We have considered only one type of government support option when a look at the mix is really called for. We should consider not only allocation of subsidies over time, but allocation of the budget among different government support options. This analysis is more difficult but might provide useful insight about trade-offs among government program options.
The nature of the firm's objectives and its methods of information processing have been assumed to be simple to make the problem tractable. If the competitive assumption is violated so that the firm's pricing strategy takes the government's subsidy policy into effect and vice-versa, then there is a gaming situation where government and firms7 policies are interdependent. One direction for further research would be to assume that the government announces a policy and the firm then maximizes its net present value given this information. Then the government problem is to determine what policy to announce, given this pricing strategy by the firm.
We have assumed here that consumers react only to present prices, i.e., they do not anticipate future subsidy increases or future price declines. These assumptions could be relaxed at the expense of more complex analysis. Finally, the models have been derived here under deterministic assumptions. Stochastic versions of the models could be explored.
To go back to our original objectives, though, our aim was to develop insight using simple models. This insight is summarized by the analytical results. Where more detailed, specific results are required, more specific models are needed. (See, e.g., Lilien 1982 , for documentation of an operational planning model for photovoltaics.)
Finally, this work can be compared to several previous studies that have analyzed pricing strategies in dynamic environments (Robinson and Lakhani 1975; Dolan and Jeuland 198 1 ; Bass and Bultez 1982; Bass 1980; and Kalish 1983) . Although the above papers have looked at the problem of a monopolist who maximizes the present value of profits, while here we use price to maximize penetration given a budget, most results are consistent. Specifically, (for zero discount rate) Kalish (1983) has shown that a monopolist should (a) set a constant price if there are no diffusion effects, (b) have price increasing if there is positive diffusion effect in the separable case, and (c) have price vary in the same way as in Case C above. These results are consistent since in both cases they represent a more efficient way of allocating resources. Along these lines our results could apply to the private sector, where, to meet a corporate objective, the firm wishes to set a price to maximize market penetration by some time in the future.
Appendix. Mathematical Derivation of Results

Part I . General
In what follows we use the following convention: Let f(x, y ) be a function of two arguments, where y itself is a function of x. We write:
i.e. the total derivative with respect to 
